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TRANSPARENCY AND EFFICIENCY TO “YES”: SUPPORT OF 
THE APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLED EVALUATIVE 
MEDIATION IN PROPERTY HOLDOUT SITUATIONS 
Dennis A. Durkin, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Holdout property owners: who are they and what are their 
interests?  The answer to this, of course, is relative to which side defines 
the term, and will be more fully analyzed throughout this Comment.  
Most fundamentally, however, holdout situations take place when 
existing landowners resist selling during “property assemblages” of 
multiple properties by either private developers or the government 
that occur for the purpose of a larger development.1  As a result of this 
refusal to sell, one frequent perception of holdouts is that their goal is 
to either “seek increased compensation” for their properties or to 
simply resist “new development in the area.”2  From the developer’s 
perspective, these holdouts boil down to opportunistic property 
owners seeking to capitalize on the fact that a developer’s inability to 
acquire any one property can effectively halt the entire development.3  
Scholars have argued that this opportunistic gaming of circumstances, 
at times, prevents “socially desirable” transfers from occurring.4 
On the other hand, from the property owner’s perspective, he is 
often refusing to sell for a variety of non-monetary reasons, such as 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2011, magna cum 
laude, Fairfield University.  Thank you to Professor Angela Carmella for her guidance 
throughout the writing of this Comment.  I am also deeply thankful to my friends and 
family for their continued love and support, especially my parents, siblings, and wife-
to-be, Kaitlin.   
 1  Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 101–02 (Md. 2014) (citing Mayor of 
Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 344 n.18 (Md. 2007)).  
 2  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 495–96 (2005). 
 3  Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 345 n.18.  
 4  Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale 
Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (2006), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3043&context=clr 
(referencing property owners who become aware of a large project requiring their 
respective properties and who subsequently hold out for “inflated prices”).  
DURKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2016  12:56 PM 
1088 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1087 
sentimental attachment to his home.5  For instance, in a 2006 
publicized episode illustrating the combination of both financial and 
non-financial rationale for refusing to sell to a large development, Vera 
Coking refused a nearly two million dollar offer from Donald Trump 
to purchase her Atlantic City property; in July 2014, this property had 
an auction reserve price of $199,000.6  Ms. Coking’s grandson has 
stated that Ms. Coking does not regret the decision because she did 
not view any of the offers as “reasonable”: “[a] few million dollars may 
sound like a lot, but it’s not for the place she loved.”7 
As an additional example of the non-monetary rationale for 
refusing to sell to a large development, the story of Edith Macefield, 
who was the alleged inspiration for the film UP, proves illustrative.8  
Although her house later sold for $310,000 in March of 2014, Ms. 
Macefield previously refused a one million dollar offer from 
developers seeking to build a mall in Seattle, Washington.9  Ms. 
Macefield stated that she did not wish to make a grand statement by 
standing up to a large development, but rather, had strong sentimental 
attachment to the property.10 
 
 
 5  Lucas J. Asper, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent 
Domain: “Just Compensation” or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 489, 491 (2007) 
(“Subjective value in the home results from the personal dignity and social status that 
accompany homeownership, as well as the sentimental value an individual places on 
the home and surrounding land.”).  See also Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: 
The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 595 (2013) 
(“[T]he owner of a house may have great sentimental attachment to the property 
because of happy memories of watching her children grow up there, but the market 
neither knows nor cares about her memories, so their value to her is not reflected in 
the property’s market price.  As a result, there is a substantial gap—a “subjective 
premium”—between the compensation that owners receive when they are paid the 
market value of their property and the substantially higher value that the owners 
themselves actually place on that property.”). 
 6  Matt A.V. Chaban, A Homeowner’s Refusal to Cash Out in a Gambling Town Proves 
Costly, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2014, at A19, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/ 
nyregion/a-homeowner-who-refused-to-cash-out-in-a-gambling-town-may-have-missed-
her-chance.html.  
 7  Id. 
 8  Dominic Kelly, The Story of The Woman Who Turned Down $1 Million For Her 
Historic Seattle Home, OPPOSING VIEWS (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.opposingviews.com/i/society/story-woman-who-turned-down-1-million-
her-historic-seattle-home.  
 9  Id. 
 10 Id. (quoting Ms. Macefield as stating: “Where would I go? . . . I don’t have any 
family and this is my home.  My mother died here, on this very couch.  I came back to 
America from England to take care of her.  She made me promise I would let her die 
at home and not in some facility, and I kept that promise.  And this is where I want to 
die.  Right in my own home.  On this couch.”).   
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This Comment will analyze the competing and divergent ways in 
which holdout property owners (“holdouts”) and developers perceive 
each other.  Part II of the Comment examines the case history of the 
Eminent Domain Clause,11 starting with an analysis of the seminal cases 
in this area and culminating in a discussion of the most recent 
decisions from both state courts and the United States Supreme 
Court.12  Additionally, this Part, through the analysis of Rick v. West, 
compares the holdouts in real property eminent domain proceedings 
to those holdouts refusing to release covenants.13  Part III examines 
and evaluates the various recommended methods to circumvent or 
resolve a holdout situation, such as “secret buying agents”14 and “land 
assembly districts.”15  Part IV proposes an additional possible solution 
to the holdout problem as an alternative to eminent domain: 
alternative dispute resolution.  This Part first surveys both the 
evaluative and transformative mediation models.  Part IV then 
ultimately espouses that alternate dispute resolution, in the form of 
evaluative mediation that implements a negotiating framework based 
on Getting to Yes16 principles, represents a transparent and efficient 
avenue to solutions for both the developer and the holdout property 
owner. 
II. HISTORY OF HOLDOUTS IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS 
A. Real Property Holdouts 
Scholars have observed that the Supreme Court addressed the 
“connection between eminent domain and the holdout problem” in 
its first decision involving the federal government’s eminent domain 
power.17  The Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in this area, up 
until Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,18 “signaled that almost any 
governmental taking, including a taking involving a private transfer, 
would qualify as a legitimate public use.”19 
 
 11  U.S. CONST. amend. V  (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
 12  See infra Part II. 
 13  Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
 14  Kelly, supra note 4. 
 15  Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 
1469–70 (2008). 
 16  ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991). 
 17  Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875)).  
 18  Id. at 11 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230–31 (1984)). 
 19  Id. at 12 (citing Mark C. Landry, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain-A 
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For nearly twenty years after Midkiff, the Supreme Court did not 
decide a “major public use case”20  This changed with the Kelo v. City of 
New London decision.21  In Kelo, nine owners of fifteen properties, 
including Susette Kelo, refused to sell to a development corporation22 
that planned to replace the homes with privately owned office 
buildings and a hotel in order to capitalize on a new research facility 
for a large pharmaceutical company.23  After having successfully 
negotiated with the majority of property owners within the planned 
development, city officials in New London argued that the 
condemnations were justifiable because of the extended condition of 
the city as a “depressed municipality.”24  In a split decision, the Court 
found the transfer of property from one private owner to another in 
the interest of economic development to constitute a legitimate 
“public use.”25  Justice O’Connor’s dissent vigorously argued that this 
was much too expansive and that “all private property is now 
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so 
long as it might be upgraded.”26 
In the immediate aftermath of Kelo, Ohio was the first state to 
confront the “economic redevelopment takings”27 issue.  In Norwood v. 
Horney, the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to “extend state law to the 
extent allowed by Kelo.”28  Norwood dealt with a situation where a 
developer was predominantly able to have property owners within a 
potential development sell their properties voluntarily, but a small 
minority refused to do so.29  In its ruling, the court emphasized the 
 
Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 430 (1985)). 
 20  Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An 
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 516 
(2006).  
 21  Id. (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 470 (2005)). 
 22  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494–95. 
 23  Id. at 474.  
 24  Id. at 504.  The New London legislature characterized the city as a “depressed 
municipality” because of its “ailing economy.”  Id. at 469.  
 25  Id. at 484–86. 
 26  Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Under the banner of economic 
development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to 
another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who 
will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the 
process.”).  
 27  Erik Stock, “We Were All Born on It. And Some of Us Was Killed on It”: Adopting A 
Transformative Model in Eminent Domain Mediation, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 687, 
691 (2008) (citing Ian Urbina, Ohio Supreme Court Rejects Taking of Homes for Project, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A18).  
 28  Id. (citing Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ohio 2006)). 
 29  Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124–25.  
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importance of individual property rights, which are thought “to be 
derived fundamentally from a higher authority and natural law” and 
are “so sacred that they could not be entrusted lightly to ‘the uncertain 
virtue of those who govern.’”30 
In Norwood, a city sought to acquire property from existing owners 
and transfer it to another private entity as a part of an “urban renewal 
plan” for a “deteriorating area.”31  The court declined to allow such a 
transfer through eminent domain, noting that “judicial review of the 
taking is paramount” when the government seeks to seize private 
property and transfer it to another private entity.32  The court here 
observed that the commingling of the private and public interests in 
such cases creates the possibility that the government’s decision to 
impose eminent domain “may be influenced by the financial gains that 
would flow to it or to the private entity because of the taking.”33 
An additional case that serves to exemplify the use of eminent 
domain in holdout situations is a 2010 New York Court of Appeals 
ruling regarding Columbia University’s acquisition of land to expand 
its campus.34  The court in Matter of Kaur v. New York State Urban 
Development Corporation allowed Columbia to effectuate the taking of 
seventeen acres for a satellite campus in West Harlem, New York.35  The 
holdouts challenging the condemnation were several business owners 
within the zone of the potential development who contended that the 
blight findings that allowed the taking were illegitimate and “only 
serve[d] the private interests of Columbia.”36  The court, however, 
reasoned that, since an earlier state decision held that the Brooklyn 
Nets basketball arena served a “public purpose,” then the educational 
promotion of Columbia University, although private, was also 
authorized as serving an equal, if not greater, “public purpose.”37  The 
court favorably cited the anticipated additional benefits of the campus 
in Harlem, including the development of two acres of park-like space, 
a stimulus to job growth in the local area through the anticipated 
hiring of 14,000 people for the construction site area, and upgrades to 
 
 30  Id. at 1128 (citing Parham v. Justices of Decatur Cty. Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 
348 (Ga. 1851)). 
 31  Id. at 1115. 
 32  Id. at 1139. 
 33  Id. at 1140. 
 34  Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010). 
 35  Id. at 724. 
 36  Id. at 724, 730.  
 37  Id. at 734 (citing Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 
N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)). 
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the overall transit infrastructure in Harlem.38  Scholarly interpretation 
of this decision argues that the standards for review and deference that 
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals gave preserves the 
“tradition of broad eminent domain power in New York by limiting the 
judiciary’s power to invalidate state condemnations.”39 
Makowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore provides an 
additional, even more recent example of the potential adverse 
outcomes that complete litigation can bring for a holdout in a 
condemnation proceeding.40  In this case, the City of Baltimore sought 
to immediately take possession of an existing property owner’s office 
building.41  In recounting the facts that the trial level found, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland drew attention to the history of the East 
Baltimore neighborhood that was the subject of the proceeding.42  In 
particular, the court noted the neighborhood’s historic loss of 
manufacturing jobs, dating as far back as the 1950s and continuing 
throughout the economic decline into the 1990s.43  This continued loss 
of jobs carried with it corresponding deleterious impacts to the 
community, including substantial crime rates and population 
decreases, which collectively forced the neighborhood’s property 
values precipitously down and produced the image of East Baltimore 
as a “proverbial ghost town.”44 
As an initial effort to ameliorate these problems, Baltimore 
attempted to restore buildings within this zone on an individual basis.45  
These efforts, however, did not work to effectively combat the “urban 
decay.”46  As a result, the city refocused its efforts of rehabilitating the 
neighborhood to a more “comprehensive” plan, which aimed to 
achieve “massive revitalization.”47  This plan focused on redeveloping 
eighty-eight acres near Johns Hopkins University Medical Center 
through the construction of buildings for such purposes as 
biotechnology research and senior housing.48 
 
 38  Id. at 729.  
 39  Matthew Pickel, Standing Pat in a Post-Kelo World: Preservation of Broad Eminent 
Domain Power in Kaur v. New York State Development Corp., 52 B.C. L. REV. 257, 259 
(2011).  
 40  Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91 (Md. 2014). 
 41  Id. at 92–94. 
 42  Id. at 94–95. 
 43  Id. at 94. 
 44  Id.  
 45  Id. at 94.  
 46  Makowski, 94 A.3d at 95.  
 47  Id.  
 48  Id.  
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Before delving into the ultimate ruling in Makowski, it is sensible 
to first examine the cases to which the court cited in support of its 
ultimate ruling on this holdout situation: Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore City v. Valsamaki49 and Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore.50  Valsamaki involved Baltimore’s attempt to use quick-take 
condemnation.51  The court held that the city must establish the 
reasons that require the city to possess a respective property 
immediately.52  The court additionally set forth the proposition that an 
impasse in negotiations for a property as part of a development does 
not allow for quick-take condemnation, since regular condemnation 
that affords “procedural due process protections” is still available in 
that event.53  Furthermore, the court also examined the definition of a 
holdout and indicated that a failure to show the presence of a holdout 
situation in conjunction with the failure to show immediate necessity 
for possession would defeat a quick-take claim.54 
The Maryland Court of Appeals, two months after its decision in 
Valsamaki, again examined the idea of the holdout in a quick-title 
action in Sapero.55  As in Valsamaki, the court in Sapero noted that there 
was potential for permitting a quick-take condemnation in the event 
of necessity, but held that the facts of the case, which demonstrated 
proposals that the city had received to redevelop the land, amongst 
other things, did not establish such necessity.56  Sapero additionally 
noted that the city’s lack of necessity manifested itself through its 
decision to stall the continuation of condemnation proceedings for 
over a year to instead go forward with the quick-take action that 
effectively “curtailed the property owner’s ability to present a 
defense.”57 
Applying the same standards espoused in both Valsamaki and 
Sapero, the court in Makowski held that the presence of a holdout in 
this case warranted the use of quick-take condemnation.58  The court 
observed that the property owner was indeed a holdout who made 
immediate possession necessary because the owner at issue was the 
 
 49  Mayor of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324 (Md. 2007). 
 50  Sapero v. Mayor of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007). 
 51  Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 326.  Quick-take condemnation allows a municipality to 
obtain “immediate possession and immediate title to a particular property.”  Id. at 327.   
 52  Id. at 324.  
 53  Id. at 346. 
 54  Id. at 345 n.18.  
 55  Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 104 (Md. 2014). 
 56  Sapero v. Mayor of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007). 
 57  Id. at 1076.  
 58  Makowski, 94 A.3d at 102. 
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only one in a block of over one hundred parcels of land who refused 
to sell, and his refusal obstructed the broader “urban renewal plan.”59  
The court proceeded to declare that the existing owner “retained 
leverage to hold a hammer over the City in order to gain financial 
advantage.”60  As support for its assertion, the court noted that 
governments seeking to develop public projects suffer from unequal 
bargaining power as a result of public knowledge of the attempted 
acquisition of certain properties.61 
B. Residential Covenant Holdouts 
While the previous discussion focused primarily on cases of real 
property holdouts, the concept of holdouts extends beyond refusing 
to sell real property to refusing to release residential covenants.62  For 
instance, in the case of Rick v. West, the plaintiffs sought to force the 
defendant to release a covenant that restricted the respective land to 
single family dwelling status so that the plaintiffs could build a 
hospital.63  After the defendant refused, the court held that a covenant 
that provides a real benefit to the person seeking to use it is 
enforceable.64 
In so ruling, Rick noted that the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest 
was free to decide that, as an “inducement to purchasers,” he would 
create the residential covenants.65  The court continued to assert that, 
since the defendant had established reliance on these covenants, the 
covenants would continue to have effect because “it is not a question 
of balancing equities or equating the advantages of a hospital on this 
site with the effect it would have on defendant’s property.”66  There is, 
however, a “reverse damages” scenario where “restrictive covenants 
should [not] be enforced unless the parties who seek enforcement pay 
compensation to the parties who maintain that changed conditions 
have rendered the restrictions unenforceable.”67  In addition, a current 
New York statute effectively renders unenforceable “non-substantial” 
 
 59  Id. at 105 (citing Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just 
Compensation” Be Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 451, 468–69 (2003)). 
 60  Id. at 106.  
 61  Id. at 105.  
 62  Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
 63  Id. at 196.  
 64  Id. at 201. 
 65  Id. at 200. 
 66  Id. 
 67  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 933 n.1 (8th ed. 2014). 
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restrictions on the use of land.68 
The situation in Rick is, in a way, analogous to the large developer 
who seeks to take the land of an existing owner to put it to a supposedly 
better use for the public.69  The court in Rick held that such a 
consideration of the competing equities to determine the supposed 
best societal use was not warranted.70  So, the question then becomes, 
what techniques are there to confront the “holdout” in either the real 
property or residential covenant context?71 
III. COMPARATIVE SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF PROFFERED SOLUTIONS 
A. Secret Purchasing Agents 
One proposed alternative to eminent domain for confronting a 
real property holdout situation is the use of secret purchasing agents.72  
This proposal makes the observation that the government customarily 
must make use of its eminent domain power to avoid a holdout 
situation.73  The proposal discerns, however, that private parties can 
circumvent the use of eminent domain through the use of undisclosed 
agents, which can make “the use of eminent domain for private parties 
unnecessary and indeed undesirable.”74 
Daniel Kelly, an advocate for this solution, notes that secret 
purchasing agents, as seen in the situation of a private party’s seeking 
to purchase the properties on a development plan, derive their 
foundational legitimacy from agency law.75  For agency law purposes in 
this area, the developer acts as the principal and authorizes the secret 
purchaser to act as an agent to deal with the third-party existing 
owner.76  The way in which these purchases occur is through a “double-
blind acquisition system,” where neither the existing owner nor the 
buying agent is aware of the larger development requiring the 
purchase of the property.77  This would potentially address a central 
issue of the holdout problem: differentiating between those existing 
owners who are refusing to sell in order to achieve an inflated price 
 
 68  Id. at 934 n.2 (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS § 951 (2016)).  
 69  See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 70  Rick, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 200. 
 71  See infra Part III.  
 72  Kelly, supra note 4.  
 73  Id. at 1.  
 74  Id.   
 75  Id. at 21–22. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. at 20–21. 
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versus those who are not.78  Since purely governmental use of eminent 
domain is “subject to democratic deliberation” and thus becomes 
public knowledge, sovereign use of secret buying agents to forego 
eminent domain proceedings generally does not occur.79 
This proposed solution ultimately seeks to prevent “socially 
undesirable” transfers of land that might otherwise occur in certain 
circumstances where eminent domain is used to transfer land to 
private parties.80  These “inefficient transfers” occur because courts 
have no way of understanding an owner’s subjective value and instead 
rely on an objective metric: fair market value.81  This sometimes 
“socially undesirable” outcome, Kelly observes, also happens in 
situations where “properties in a purportedly blighted neighborhood 
are valued more highly by the existing owners than by the assembler.”82 
There are notable examples of large-scale implementations of 
secret purchasing agents.83  For instance, Harvard University, in an 
attempt to circumvent a potential holdout issue involving an existing 
property owner seeking an inflated price, used secret purchasing 
agents to purchase multiple parcels of land at a total cost of eighty-
eight million dollars.84  Likewise, Disney also used these agents to amass 
over one thousand acres of land for its theme parks.85  Disney primarily 
took advantage of the secret purchasing agents to “overcome potential 
strategic behavior among sellers.”86 
While these instances certainly provide illustrations of the 
potential efficacy of secret purchasing agents, there are also 
countervailing risks associated with the mechanism.87  These risks 
include: (1) foregoing positive externalities; (2) long durations of 
assembly and the possibility of collusion; and (3) distrust in the 
system.88  The use of purchasing agents will potentially fail to overcome 
disincentives to development in instances where the societal benefit is 
greater than the value of the properties of the existing owners but 
 
 78  Kelly, supra note 4, at 24. 
 79  Id. at 1. 
 80  Id. at 25.  
 81  Id. at 6–7. 
 82  Id. at 58.   
 83  Id. at 6. 
 84  Kelly, supra note 4, at 6. 
 85  Id. (citing Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers to Amass Land Stage for 
Kingdom, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K-2). 
 86  Id. at 22–23 (citing Tim O’Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse, LEGAL 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at 2).  
 87  Id. at 41–49. 
 88  Id.  
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where the private benefit is lower than the value of those properties.89  
In these cases, the private party will not receive sufficient inducement 
to proceed with the development—even with secret purchasing 
agents—and a project that would have a net societal benefit will not 
take place.90 
In addition, the use of secret purchasing agents carries with it an 
elongated bargaining process and the threat of collusion.91  For 
example, the use of secret purchasing agents is often a time-intensive 
process because it requires bargaining with each existing owner, 
whereas eminent domain allows for relatively instantaneous 
acquisitions.92  While eminent domain still might require years of 
litigation,93 its use is potentially preferable to secret purchasing agents 
where the development necessitates expedience.94  Furthermore, there 
exists a possibility of collusion in the process between the agent and 
the existing owner where the agent, if cognizant of the larger 
development, could either inform the owner of the development or 
increase the price offer for a “kickback.”95 
Moreover, there exists the issue of creating general distrust in the 
system when developers utilize secret purchasing agents.96  Since the 
use of these agents is contrary to normal “full disclosure” negotiation, 
the practice has the potential to engender the perception of the 
developer as “deceptive.”97  In fact, when the owners discover the 
hidden developer, the negotiations often fail.98  Existing owners who 
find out that they have dealt with secret agents may subsequently lose 
their trust in future property transactions.99  This breakdown in trust 
can ultimately compel the developer to attempt to make costly amends 
with the community, such as where Harvard—in response to public 
censure of its use of secret purchasing agents—paid the government 
voluntarily.100  Furthermore, even those who have not directly dealt 
 
 89  Id. at 42.  
 90  Kelly, supra note 4, at 42. 
 91  Id. at 45–47. 
 92  Id. at 45 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40–42 (2d ed. 
1977); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owners: One More Salute 
to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 572 (1993); Thomas Merrill, Book Note, Rent 
Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1570 (1986)). 
 93  Id.  
 94  See id. 
 95  Id. at 46–47.  
 96  Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–49. 
 97  Id. at 47.  
 98  Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468. 
 99  Kelly, supra note 4, at 47. 
 100  See id. at 47–48 (citing Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions Thawing as Harvard 
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with secret purchasing agents but become aware of their general 
existence may take “wasteful precautions” to determine whether a 
buyer is a secret purchasing agent.101 
B. Land Assembly Districts 
Another proposed alternative to eminent domain for dealing with 
the holdout issue is known as the “land assembly district” (LAD).102  
This solution aims to provide a way in which property assemblages can 
occur “without harming the poor and powerless,” which is the type of 
harm that advocates of the proposal believe eminent domain can cause 
in certain instances.103  The advocates of this mechanism note that 
holdouts pose the problem of “underassembly” in private property 
transactions.104  This issue occurs where a developer values a parcel of 
a desired assembly higher than the individual owner of that parcel 
contained within that assembly, but that owner nevertheless 
strategically seeks a higher price, thereby diminishing the interest of 
the developer to assemble the properties at all.105 
While the government has the power of eminent domain to deal 
with this issue, scholars note that eminent domain proceedings can 
result in “confiscatory condemnations”106 and often do not compensate 
the owner with any “subjective surplus.”107  The proposal seeks to have 
the law “retrofit a community with a condominium-like structure.”108  
The LAD formation and approval would be subject to a process 
“substantially parallel to those involved in existing redevelopment and 
condemnation procedures,” but the approving commission would 
need to “certify that a LAD is necessary to overcome the problem of 
excess fragmentation.”109  This structure places a community into a 
district that would require a majority vote to approve the sale of the 
district to a “developer or municipality seeking to consolidate the land 
into a single parcel.”110  Scholars contend that this would circumvent 
 
Earns Allston’s Trust: University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 
2003, at B3).  
 101  Id. at 48. 
 102  Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468. 
 103  Id. at 1467. 
 104  Id. at 1468 (citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in 
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 639, 673–74 (1998)). 
 105  Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 927–28 
(2004). 
 106  Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1527. 
 107  Id. at 1468. 
 108  Id. at 1469.  
 109  Id. at 1489. 
 110  Id. at 1469. 
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the holdout situation because the owners would be subject to a 
“collective voting procedure.”111 
While this proposal certainly has the potential to mitigate the 
holdout problem, it too brings corresponding concerns.  For instance, 
there exists the risk of “majoritarian tyranny” due to the voting 
schematic of the proposal that requires a majority decision.112  This 
structure threatens minority property owners, as the majority may 
“enact rules solely benefiting itself at the expense of a minority for no 
better reason than that the majority can hold together a coalition of 
the selfish.”113  Additionally, the majority may vote for a given assembly 
when other property owners within it would not do so.114  The 
constituent elements of the district’s majority may additionally be 
corporate entities, such as real estate investment funds, which may by 
their nature perceive the district as a strict investment endeavor and 
fail to account for the subjective valuation of any individual property.115  
Furthermore, those with “transient” interests within the district could 
potentially “gang up on owners with deep connections to their 
parcels.”116  Thus, while LADs offer a democratic mechanism to 
confront the holdout issue in the real property setting as an alternative 
to eminent domain, it may run the risk of failing to adequately protect 
the interests of the minority within the district.117 
Each of the proposed solutions above offers theoretically 
attractive alternatives to the use of eminent domain for dealing with 
the holdout situation.  Without more widespread acceptance of secret 
purchasing agents and in the absence of the creation of LADs, 
however, an already available alternative that has proven itself to be a 
highly effective tool in numerous other areas will provide a practical 
solution to the problem: mediation. 
 
 
 
 
 111  See id. at 1469–70. 
 112  Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1499. 
 113  Id.   
 114  Id. at 1498. 
 115  Id. at 1499. 
 116  Id. at 1503. 
 117  See supra notes 102–16. 
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR MEDIATION THAT USES PRINCIPLED FRAMEWORK 
A. Mediation Benefits 
The notion of dissuading traditional litigation is not a novel one, 
as both federal judges and American Presidents have noted the 
potential drawbacks of proceeding to trial.118  Abraham Lincoln, for 
instance, exhorted the following: “Discourage litigation.  Persuade 
your clients to compromise whenever you can.  Point out to them how 
the nominal winner is often the real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste 
of time.”119  Furthermore, and more specifically for purposes of this 
Comment, the notion of alternate dispute resolution in the context of 
eminent domain proceedings is also well established and has been 
used since the 1660s.120 
An additional form of alternate dispute resolution used in 
eminent domain proceedings, mediation, consists of an independent 
mediator engaging with the government and the existing property 
owner in order to have both parties come to terms with an agreement 
that both sides find suitable.121  The mediation session is dependent on 
the will of the parties and can occur at any stage at which the parties 
agree to do so.122  In this circumstance, the mediator functions to 
“facilitate communication between the parties, identify their respective 
interests, and, hopefully, help them resolve the issues on terms with 
which both can live.”123  At the mediation session, both parties, with 
legal representation, join the mediator.124  The format of the mediation 
is subject to tailoring and variation to fit the needs of the parties.125  The 
mediation process begins with a joint session involving the parties and 
the mediator.126  Then, the mediator conducts separate caucuses with 
each party.127  During these caucuses, the mediator separately conveys 
offers between the parties through “shuttle diplomacy.”128  Ultimately, 
 
 118  Deborah A. Ferguson, Eight Benefits of Mediation, ADVO., Oct. 2012, at 44, 44. 
 119  Id.  
 120  Stock, supra note 27, at 692 (citing LISA JARDINE, THE CURIOUS LIFE OF ROBERT 
HOOKE: THE MAN WHO MEASURED LONDON 157–59 (2004)). 
 121  Stanley Leasure & Ray Gosack, Eminently Sensible: Why Mediation Works in Eminent 
Domain Cases, ICMA.ORG (May 27, 2014), http://icma.org/m/en/Article/ 
104506/Eminently_Sensible.  
 122  Id. 
 123  Id.   
 124  Id.  
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121. 
 128  Id.  Shuttle diplomacy is a process where the mediator is “relaying offers and 
counter offers between the parties and continuing to assist the parties and their 
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the goal is to have the mediator join the parties again to write and sign 
a settlement agreement.129 
The advantages to mediation include high reports of settlement, 
low costs, increased confidentiality, and a greater degree of control.130  
Settlement rates for mediation are approximately eighty percent, with 
the settlement rate for eminent domain mediations tracking closely to 
that figure, albeit with a small sample size of reported settlements.131  
For instance, this sample consists of a mediator in Tennessee who has 
conducted eminent domain mediations and approximates the 
settlement rate of his cases at around eighty percent.132 
Furthermore, mediation foregoes the costs associated with 
litigation, including the potentially sizeable expenses of “pretrial 
attorney fees and costs arising from discovery, depositions, transcripts, 
motions, briefs, research, experts and witnesses.”133  The slow nature of 
the litigation process further compounds these costs, which increase 
over time.134  Eminent domain litigation costs additionally include 
“negative public perception.”135  In contrast, mediation is “far less 
expensive,” allows the cost of the mediator to be shared equally 
amongst the parties, and is generally less time consuming.136 
Mediation also offers increased confidentiality, whereas litigation 
is often an “extremely public process.”137  This confidentiality comes 
about as a result of statutes that prohibit the admission of evidence 
concerning the mediation.138  Statutes also view the information 
presented to the mediator as protected.139  Furthermore, the parties 
can add additional confidentiality protection through any agreed 
upon contractual stipulations.140 
 
 
 
representatives to analyze the important elements of the case.”  Id.   
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  TENN. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, EMINENT DOMAIN IN 
TENNESSEE 9 (2013), https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/tacir/attachments/ 
EminentDomain.pdf. 
 133  Ferguson, supra note 118, at 45. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121. 
 136  Ferguson, supra note 118, at 45. 
 137  Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. 
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The voluntary nature of mediation allows the parties to exert 
significant control over the way in which the process occurs.141  The 
parties are not obligated to follow “court-mandated procedures” and 
instead have the freedom to define their own process.142  Since the 
process is voluntary, the parties can reach a compromise.143  This is in 
clear contrast to litigation, where the judgment at trial will create a 
“winner and loser.”144  Furthermore, the parties exert autonomy when 
they choose the mediator of the dispute.145 
B. Examples of the Use of Mediation to Avoid Eminent Domain 
Proceedings 
A recent example of the use of mediators to avoid eminent 
domain litigation is the attempt of Vermont Gas Systems to run 
pipeline through various private properties.146  After failing to reach an 
agreement with a minority percentage of the affected property owners 
for the easements, the company offered those owners the opportunity 
to conduct mediations with third-party mediators.147  A spokesperson 
for Vermont Gas lauded mediation as an attractive alternative to 
eminent domain litigation because it is “quicker and generally 
cheaper.”148 
Another example of the successful use of mediation to forego 
eminent domain proceedings is found in Fort Smith, Arkansas.149  The 
city made substantial use of mediation in its efforts to acquire various 
properties “for expansion of a regional water-supply lake.”150  Before 
beginning the mediations, the town informed the landowners that the 
city would pay for the cost of the mediator in order to “encourage 
participation.”151  In the group sessions of the mediations, the city made 
sure to inform the property owners of the regional benefits of the 
project as well as the city’s intention to be fair during the 
 
 141  Ferguson, supra note 118. 
 142  Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121. 
 143  Ferguson, supra note 118. 
 144  Id.   
 145  Id. 
 146  Vermont Gas Offers Landowners Mediation, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/13/vermont-gas-offers-
landowners-mediation/.  
 147  Id. http://icma.org/m/en/Article/104506/Eminently_Sensible 
 148  Joel Baird, Vermont Gas Upbeat on Pipeline Mediation, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS 
(Aug. 12, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/local/ 
vermont/2014/08/12/vermont-gas-upbeat-pipeline-mediation/13966905/.  
 149  Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121. 
 150  Id.  
 151  Id. 
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negotiations.152  The mediations were so uniformly successful that each 
session resulted in a settlement.153 
C.  Proposal for Transformative Model 
One type of proposed mediation as an alternative to eminent 
domain proceedings is based on the “transformative” method.154  This 
proposal recognizes that mediation in general may address 
“problematic power imbalances inherent in any eminent domain 
dispute.”155  The transformative model, along with the “facilitative” and 
“evaluative” models, is a “generally accepted mediation [model].”156  
The transformative model consists of the least involved mediator, while 
the evaluative process implements the most involved mediator of the 
three aforementioned models.157  In the transformative process, the 
mediator does not unilaterally establish the way in which the mediation 
will occur, but rather seeks input from the parties as to how to organize 
the session.158  To foster and encourage “engagement” between the 
parties, the transformative mediator makes use of unstructured 
questioning without suggesting the answer beforehand.159  While the 
mediator here is minimally involved, he will nevertheless draw 
attention to points in the discussion where one party “recognizes and 
acknowledges the perspective of the other.”160 
The proposal for transformative mediation supports that model 
specifically in the eminent domain context because the minimal 
involvement of the transformative mediator may lead to maintenance 
of the relationship between the parties.161  An advocate for the 
proposal, Erik Stock, notes that the mediator who implements a 
transformative methodology seeks “to foster opportunities for the 
disputants to experience empowerment and recognition.”162  The 
transformative model, Stock argues, will allow the existing owner in an 
eminent domain proceeding to feel “empowerment.”163  According to 
Stock, the use of the transformative model is particularly appealing in 
 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. 
 154  Stock, supra note 27, at 687–88. 
 155  Id. at 694–95. 
 156  Id. at 696–97. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. at 697.  
 159  Id. at 697–98. 
 160  Stock, supra note 27, at 697. 
 161  Id.  
 162  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 163  Id. 
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this context because eminent domain cases frequently involve parties 
located in “neighborhoods lacking in political power,” and the 
transformative model affords those parties an opportunity to “gain a 
voice in a dispute where they might otherwise have none and 
reconnect to the government entity involved in the dispute.”164 
Stock goes on to cite the Uniform Mediation Act (“the Act”) as 
reinforcement for the transformative model, since the Act emphasizes 
“self-determination” in order to create a sense of equity and 
satisfaction with the mediation proceeding.165  This transformative 
dynamic, according to Stock, is potentially useful because it 
necessitates cooperation where there can be a large “emotional and 
psychic” discrepancy between the property owner and the government 
in eminent domain cases.166  Furthermore, Stock contends that, on a 
more macro level, the transformative model will preserve the 
relationship between property owners and the government by 
engendering “democratic values,” which the scholar deems potentially 
greater than reaching a settlement.167  Stock’s conclusion emphasizes 
the process value of mediation, where if the property owner feels a 
sense of “empowerment” while dealing with the government through 
a robust level of control in the mediation itself, then the use of the 
transformative method is justified.168 
D. Argument for an Evaluative Model of Mediation to Avoid Eminent 
Domain Litigation 
While the proposal of a transformative model certainly has 
appealing and meritorious characteristics, including the 
empowerment of the existing owner as discussed supra,169 a holdout 
situation may call for more active involvement from the mediator in an 
effort to reach a settlement.  This active involvement is a chief feature 
of evaluative mediation—indeed, it consists of the highest level of 
mediator involvement of the three primary mediation models.170  
Whereas a transformative mediator takes a predominantly hands-off 
approach in an effort to bestow upon the parties a sense of control 
over the mediation process, an evaluative mediator focuses much more 
on the outcome of the mediation and “will not only encourage 
 
 164  Id. at 698. 
 165  Id. at 700.  
 166  Stock, supra note 27, at 701.  
 167  Id. at 702–03. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 696. 
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settlement, but will at times propose a particular outcome for the 
dispute.”171 
In general, an evaluative mediator “focuses on the legal rights of 
the parties and evaluates the merits of each party’s claim.”172  A 
mediator who implements this methodology seeks to address the 
fundamental origin of the controversy.173  While this technique 
engenders a “more practical focus than in a purely facilitative 
mediation,” it does not do so to neglect either side’s interests.174 
A core competency of the evaluative model is the ability of the 
mediator to act as an “agent of reality” for the parties.175  The evaluative 
mediator acts as such when providing objective and neutral advice.176  
The mediator in this evaluative capacity seeks to reach a settlement by 
overcoming “unrealistic opinions about the value of [the parties’] 
claims.”177  To accomplish this end, an evaluative mediator “provides 
new information, helps parties realize the costs and risks of litigation, 
and points out weaknesses and strengths of each side.”178 
More specifically in the eminent domain context, an evaluative 
mediator provides the parties with “opinions on any of the many issues 
which arise in eminent domain matters, including the potential 
outcome at trial.”179  The evaluative mediator in this context may also 
candidly assess the costs and benefits of proceeding to litigate the 
issue.180  During this discussion, the evaluative mediator may choose to 
present a “verdict range” that incorporates the probability of potential 
outcomes within that realm of possibilities.181  Since an evaluative 
mediator has this ability to offer opinions on the matter, the use of an 
“experienced mediator with eminent domain expertise” serves to 
 
 171  Id. at 696–97. 
 172  Kenneth M. Roberts, Mediating the Evaluative-Facilitative Debate: Why Both Parties 
Are Wrong and a Proposal for Settlement, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 187, 195 (2007) (citing 
Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns About the Nature and 
Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 268 (2000)). 
 173  Id. (citing Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 
J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 313–14 (2000)). 
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. at 196 (citing Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 315 (2000)). 
 176  See id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Roberts, supra note 172, at 196.  
 179  Stanley Leasure, Eminent Domain Disputes: The Role of Mediation, RIGHT OF WAY, 
Mar./Apr. 2012, at 32, 33, https://www.irwaonline.org/eweb/upload/web_mar_ 
apr12_EminentDomainMediation.pdf. 
 180  See id. at 34.  
 181  See id. 
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enhance the session.182 
E. Incorporating Principled Framework to Evaluative Model 
This Comment proposes that a principled negotiating framework 
based on the seminal book Getting to Yes183 will augment the efficacy of 
evaluative mediation in the eminent domain context.  Scholars have 
referred to this work as the “‘Bible’ for cooperative negotiations and 
generally a very useful blueprint for mediation.”184  The main precepts 
of the work are: “1) separating the people from the problem, 2) 
focusing on interests not positions, 3) inventing options for mutual 
gain, and 4) using objective criteria.”185 
1. Separating the People from the Problem 
As to the first principle of “separating the people from the 
problem,” the book notes that “[t]he ability to see the situation as the 
other side sees it, as difficult as it may be, is one of the most important 
skills a negotiator can possess.”186  This ability to analyze the situation 
from both sides underscores the evaluative mediator’s goal of objective 
assessment of the root causes of the case.187  Furthermore, while this 
principle recommends focusing on the problem itself, it does not 
disregard the emotions of the parties involved and advises negotiators 
to “deal with the people as human beings.”188  Since emotions on the 
part of the potential holdouts have the tendency to run high,189 the 
evaluative mediator would be prudent to heed the advice of this 
principle and recognize these human emotions at the mediation 
session, while maintaining a simultaneous but separate focus on the 
problem, as the principle suggests. 
The use of this principle is highly complementary to evaluative 
mediation, which emphasizes the role of the mediator as bringing 
objective and neutral reality to the parties.190  Conversely, this principle 
is at odds with the precepts of transformative mediation, which does 
not separate the people from the problem but instead seeks to have 
 
 182  See id. at 33. 
 183  FISHER & URY, supra note 16. 
 184  See, e.g., John Barkai, What’s A Cross-Cultural Mediator to Do? A Low-Context Solution 
for a High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 43, 81 (2008).  
 185  Id. (discussing FISHER & URY, supra note 16).   
 186  FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 23. 
 187  See Roberts, supra note 172.  
 188  FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.  
 189  See, e.g., supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 190  See Roberts, supra note 172, at 196 (citing Richard Birke, Evaluation and 
Facilitation: Moving Past Either / Or, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 315 (2000)).   
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the parties feel empowerment over the problem.191  The use of 
evaluative mediation with the application of this principle is preferable 
to the transformative model in the eminent domain context because, 
while it would address the emotional element192 of potentially selling 
one’s property, it would not allow these emotions to create “unrealistic 
opinions about the value of their claims” that would conceivably 
interfere with a settlement.193  For instance, in the example of Vera 
Coking, who turned down an offer to sell her property for nearly two 
million dollars to Donald Trump only to ultimately have the property 
receive an auction reserve price of approximately $1.8 million less than 
that offer,194 an evaluative mediator would have acted as an “agent of 
reality” to make Ms. Coking aware of this potential precipitous price 
decrease as well as the objective assessment of the offer at the time it 
was made.195 
By adhering to this principle, the evaluative mediator would also 
be able to avoid the potential issue of distrust in the system related to 
the secret purchasing agent proposal.196  That proposal would 
effectively remove the people from the problem through the use of 
undisclosed purchasing agents so as to not make an existing owner 
aware of a larger development plan, but this practice is often seen as 
“deceptive.”197  Indeed, property owners who come to realize that they 
have transacted with undisclosed agents may suffer from a breakdown 
in trust in future property dealings.198  This “separating the people 
from the problem” principle seeks to accomplish just what it claims; 
however, it untangles the issue at hand from emotion, but does not 
wholly remove the human component.199  Thus, the evaluative 
mediator implementing this principle would not have to rely on 
deception, as is the potential case with the use of secret purchasing 
agents.200  In order to achieve a positive outcome for the parties, the 
evaluative mediator can still objectively assess the merits of each party’s 
position without conflating the problem with emotion.201  This would 
forego the potential costs to the secret purchasing agent proposal, 
 
 191  Stock, supra note 27, at 701. 
 192  See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.  
 193  Roberts, supra note 172, at 196.  
 194  See Chaban, supra note 6.   
 195  Roberts, supra note 172, at 196.  
 196  See Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–49. 
 197  Id. at 47. 
 198  Id. 
 199  See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.  
 200  See Kelly, supra note 4, at 47. 
 201  See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 39.  
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including the monetary costs associated with making a financial 
apology to the community, as was the case with the Harvard example,202 
and the costs associated with precautionary assessments of whether a 
buyer is a secret purchasing agent.203 
2. Focus on Interests 
As to the second principle of “focusing on interests not positions,” 
Getting to Yes asserts that, “a close examination of the underlying 
interests will reveal the existence of many more interests that are 
shared or compatible than ones that are opposed.”204  This focus on 
interests by the evaluative mediator would lend itself to separating 
those property owners who are holding out for opportunistic reasons 
from those holding out for non-monetary reasons.205  For instance, the 
evaluative mediator would aim to objectively determine whether 
someone like Edith Macefield is actually imputing a sentimental 
premium on the value of a given property, is strategically seeking a 
higher price knowing that her property is essential to the larger 
development scheme, or is indeed attempting to make some sort of 
grand statement against the development itself.206  As another example, 
in the Columbia University expansion case, the evaluative mediator 
would actively seek to establish whether the business-owner holdouts 
in that case truly believed that the area was not blighted,207 or whether 
the business owners’ true interests for holding out were strategic in 
nature. 
This is an additional, yet appealing, distinguishing characteristic 
of evaluative mediation implementing this principle from the 
transformative model, since the transformative mediator would simply 
focus on creating the feeling of empowerment amongst the parties.208  
While there is a strong argument that this emphasis on the process will 
enable the parties to feel a greater sense of control over the 
mediation,209 the session may very well conclude without an objective 
third party determining the reasoning behind the refusal to sell, which 
 
 202  Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–48 (citing Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions 
Thawing as Harvard Earns Allston’s Trust: University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support, 
BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2003, at B3). 
 203  Kelly, supra note 4, at 48. 
 204  FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 42. 
 205  See supra Part I. 
 206  Kelly, supra note 8. 
 207  Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2010). 
 208  Stock, supra note 27, at 697. 
 209  Id.  
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is the precise determination that this focus on interests promotes.210  
This would ultimately better enable the evaluative mediator in the 
active promotion of settlement.211 
3. Inventing Options for Mutual Gain 
Moreover, in reference to the third principle of “inventing 
options for mutual gain,” the book notes that, “[i]n a complex 
situation, creative inventing is an absolute necessity.  In any 
negotiation it may open doors and produce a range of potential 
agreements satisfactory to each side.”212  The potential efficacy of the 
application of this principle is seen in the result in Rick v. West, a case 
in which the construction of a hospital did not occur because of a 
holdout’s enforcement of a residential covenant.213  The court held 
that it would not conduct a balancing of the potential benefits of a 
hospital with the potential burden imposed on the covenant holder if 
it were not enforced, but would instead focus on whether the covenant-
created reliance was an “inducement to purchasers.”214  In such a case, 
an evaluative mediator implementing this principle would attempt to 
come up with a broad range of possible solutions215 that could produce 
the ostensibly favorable result of the construction of a hospital, such as 
possibly giving the holder of the restrictive covenant some interested 
stake in the new hospital for releasing the covenant.  In addition, the 
evaluative mediator could use his active involvement in the mediation 
to create solutions based on the purported benefits of the 
development, such as in Matter of Kaur v. New York State Urban 
Development Corporation, where an evaluative mediator could potentially 
have based a number of creative solutions on the litany of potential 
benefits of Columbia University’s expansion, such as its creation of 
thousands of jobs and benefits to the local transit system and 
environment.216 
This is another chief advantage of evaluative mediation over its 
transformative counterpart, since the more active involvement of the 
evaluative mediator is more conducive to the creation of different, 
possible solutions, as opposed to the general passivity of the 
 
 210  FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 42. 
 211  Id. 
 212  Id. at 79–80. 
 213  Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
 214  Id. at 201. 
 215  FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 79–80. 
 216  Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 734–35 (N.Y. 2010).  
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transformative mediator.217  Furthermore, the evaluative mediator 
could also present the parties with a probability analysis of these 
outcomes if a trial is needed as a backdrop to any other devised 
solutions so as to convey the possible risks involved with each 
solution.218 
4. Establishment of Objective Criteria 
Finally, Getting to Yes encourages establishing “objective criteria” 
upon which to base the negotiations.219  This measurement, the book 
argues, should consider “standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific 
merit.”220  This principle complements the risk-assessment and 
opinion-providing function of the evaluative mediator221 by 
underscoring the need to establish an objective basis for that 
judgment. 
One such possible criteria to assist the evaluative mediator’s 
creation of a “verdict range”222 would be the use of past holdout case 
results.  For instance, Kelo could potentially provide caution to the 
holdout who is considering creating an impasse at mediation, as the 
Supreme Court, albeit in a split decision, asserted the transfer of 
property from one private owner to another in the interest of 
economic growth to be a permissible “public use.”223  Similarly, 
Makowski illustrates another result that the evaluative mediator could 
use as an objective benchmark to provide admonition to a would-be 
holdout.  There, the court provided guidance as to who constitutes a 
holdout and ultimately held that the refusal to sell in that case 
amounted to interference with the more comprehensive “urban 
renewal plan” at issue and thus warranted condemnation.224 
Conversely, the evaluative mediator could juxtapose these 
potential outcomes with the result in Norwood, which held that 
condemnation was not warranted when a municipality attempted to 
obtain private property and transfer it to another private party in order 
to ostensibly revitalize the city, with the court noting that this raises the 
possibility of improper financial benefits to the city or to the private 
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party to which the property is ultimately transferred.225  Thus, these 
case results could provide the evaluative mediator with the tools 
necessary to establish the type of “objective criteria” that Getting to Yes 
espouses.226 
V. CONCLUSION 
 This Comment began with the definition of a holdout as a 
landowner who resists or refuses to sell to a larger development.  These 
holdouts are often subject to eminent domain proceedings to 
effectuate the development.  As discussed, various alternatives to 
eminent domain exist to deal with the holdout issue, including secret 
purchasing agents and land assembly districts. This Comment then 
advanced evaluative mediation as a beneficial approach to dealing with 
holdouts due to this model’s emphasis on mediator activity and 
settlement. 
The proposal centered on the general appeal of mediation, 
including the cost and control advantages compared to traditional 
litigation of eminent domain cases.  More specifically, this Comment 
argued that evaluative mediation is better suited to reach the needed 
settlements in eminent domain cases through the ability of the 
mediator to actively provide evaluations of the matter, distinguished 
from the general passivity of a transformative mediator.  This 
Comment then offered a negotiating framework, based on Getting to 
Yes principles, to complement and enhance this evaluative mediation.  
Using this framework, the mediator will have a strong basis upon which 
to conduct these potentially highly emotional holdout cases as well as 
to provide independent opinions of these cases based on objective 
criteria. 
 
 
 225  Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1139–40 (Ohio 2006).  
 226  FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 83. 
